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This thesis analyzes financial distress of firms from the financial point of view through 
a case study of Midopa Department Store which went bankrupt in 1998. Financial 
distress of firms throughout the world is a frequent occurrence with important 
implications to many stakeholders. In Korea since the IMF crisis, people have 
experienced great hardship due to financial distress of firms. Financially distressed 
firms can either be restructured and successfully emerge as continuing entities or be 
liquidated for the benefit of creditors before their asset value is dissipated. The 
treatment of financially distressed firms, however, does not entirely depend on financial 
analysis. Political consideration, long-term economic plan, and the social atmosphere 
including reaction of labor union are implicitly or explicitly involved in the process. 
This thesis examines the implications of financial distress by analyzing the causes and 
possible restructuring options of Midopa Department Store. 
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I. Introduction 
 
1. Background and Purpose of the Thesis 
 
Since the IMF crisis in 1997, many Korean firms including the chaebols experienced 
significant hardship due to financial distress. Although there are some companies who 
graduated from financial distress through their own restructuring program, still many 
companies are undergoing financial treatment and some had to close down their 
business. 
Many stakeholders such as investors, creditors, suppliers, buyers and employees have 
suffered from financial distress. Therefore, preventing a firm from financial distress in 
advance is quite important. Also, the choice of optimal treatment of a financially 
distressed firm is crucial for the purpose of minimizing the costs and difficulties.  
Through the case study of Midopa, an insolvent company in 1998, this thesis will look 
for the causes of financial distress and calculate its pro-forma liquidation value and 
reorganization value as a going concern in order to find out the optimal treatment. 
According to the valuation result, it was suggested whether the firm should be 
liquidated or continue its operations. 
The valuation and restructuring suggestion of this thesis may be different from 
Midopa’s real situation due to limited access of materials. Financial consideration is just 
one factor when an insolvent firm’s optimal treatment is chosen. In some cases, other 
factors like political reasons, regional characteristics, reaction of labor union and so on 
should also be considered.   
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2. Organization and Methodology 
 
Chapter II discusses the basic concept and theory of financial distress by describing the 
definition, general causes, treatment of financially distressed firms and forecasting 
model for financial distress.  
Chapter III examines what caused the financial distress of Midopa Department Store by 
applying the basic concept and theory from Chapter II.   
Chapter IV calculates the value of Midopa Department Store in two ways - “Liquidation 
Value” and “Reorganization Value as Going Concern” – and provides a restructuring 
scenario.  
Materials concerning Midopa Department Store were obtained through publicly 
available financial data and press reports.  
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), a valuation tool, is employed to evaluate the 
reorganization value of the firm. The DCF method adopted in this thesis follows the 
structure of financial modeling proposed by Simon Benninga. (Simon Benninga, 1997)      
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II. Literature Review of Financial Distress   
 
1. Definition of Financial Distress 
 
A firm is in financial distress when it is having significant trouble paying its debts as 
they come due. A variety of terms are used to describe a financially distressed firm. 
Three of the more widely used terms are bankrupt, in default, and insolvent. They have 
different shades of meaning. 
A firm is bankrupt when it has filed a petition for relief from its creditors under the 
bankruptcy code, or when it has consented to a filing by its creditors. The filing 
signifies either that the firm has not paid debts that have come due or that it will become 
unable to pay them within the foreseeable future. 
A firm is in default when it violates one of the terms of loan agreement or bond in-
denture. It is useful to distinguish between technical defaults and payment defaults. A 
technical default occurs when the debtor violates a loan covenant. Technical defaults 
rarely lead to bankruptcy. They are usually cured through negotiation with creditors. A 
payment default occurs when the firm misses a scheduled interest payment or principal 
payment. If there is a grace period, the default actually occurs after it has expired. A 
payment default is generally more serious than a technical default. However, even when 
a firm is in default, it is not necessarily bankrupt. It can continue to operate while it tries 
to negotiate an out-of court restructuring with its creditors. 
A firm is insolvent when it is unable to pay its debts. It is useful to distinguish between 
technical insolvency and bankruptcy insolvency. Technical insolvency occurs because 
of a lack of cash. Bankruptcy insolvency occurs when the firm’s total liabilities exceed 
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the fair market value of its total assets. The firm’s true net worth is negative, while 
means that the value of its assets is insufficient to pay its debts. Technical insolvency 
may be a temporary cond ition. Bankruptcy insolvency usually indicates a more serious 
distressed condition. (Emery & Finnerty, 1997) 
Meanwhile, Ross, Westfield & Jaffe classified insolvency into “Flow based insolvency” 
and “Stock based insolvency” as follows. 
Stock Based Insolvency : It occurs when the value of the assets of firm is less than value 
of the debt, which implies negative equity. 
Flow Based Insolvency : It occurs when a firm’s cash flows are insufficient to cover 
contractually required payments. 
So, “Technical insolvency” has the same meaning with a “Flow based insolvency” and 
“Bankruptcy insolvency” is equal to “Stock based insolvency”. 
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2. Causes of Financial Distress 
 
Financial distress results from deterioration of a firm’s financial performance and can 
have many causes. Poor management, unwise expansion, intense competition, too much 
debt, massive litigation, and unfavorable contracts are just a few of the possible causes. 
(Emery & Finnerty, 1997) 
Also, it can be occurred by external factors such as business cycle, general crisis, and 
credit crunch. When a firm faces financial distress resulting from external factors, it is a 
matter of survival for every firm. Here, some of the controllable factors are described.  
 
2.1 Poor Management 
Surprisingly, this is the leading cause of corporate financial distress. According to Dun 
& Bradstreet survey, 94% of business failure was caused by lack of management 
experience, unbalanced experience, or outright managerial incompetence. 
2.2 Unwise Expansion 
This is serious when a company just pursues expansion for economies of scales, 
forecasting the industry with too optimistic view. 
External environment for a company’s business can be unexpectedly unfavorable. 
Examples are collapse of market condition and occurrence of substitutes. 
2.3 Intense Competition 
Intense competition can lead companies to go bankrupt because of the price competition 
through marginal cost cutting. 
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2.4 Too Much Debt 
Too heavy burden of interest payment followed by accumulated debts cause financial 
distress of companies as well as high borrowing cost. When bankruptcy cost is bigger 
than tax benefit, borrowing cost increases. 
If interest coverage ratio is too low due to too much debt, firms cannot cover the interest 
payment only with EBIT (Earning Before Interest and Tax). 
2.5 Massive Litigation 
It is natural for firms to meet the conflict of interest with competitors, suppliers, buyers, 
even workers or public regarding trading, technology, working condition, and 
environment. 
Such kind of conflict results in accrua l liabilities, which may give companies a threat of 
insolvency. 
2.6 Others 
Other factors such as unfavorable contracts, neglect, disaster, badly devised strategy and 
fraud would be also causes of financial distress. 
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3. Treatment on Financially Distressed Firm  
 
Firms that cannot or choose not to make contractually required payments to creditors 
have two basic options : liquidation or reorganization. 
Liquidation means termination of the firm as a going concern; it involves selling the 
assets of the firm for salvage value. The proceeds, net of transaction costs, are 
distributed to creditors in order of established priority.  
Reorganization is the option of keeping the firm a going concern. It sometimes involves 
issuing new securities to replace old securities. 
(Ross, Westfield & Jaffe, 1998) 
Liquidation and formal reorganization may be done by bankruptcy. But, reorganization 
may be conducted outside bankruptcy, because bankruptcy is time-consuming and 
expensive. For these reasons, financially distressed firms usually try to reorganize 
outside bankruptcy before filing for bankruptcy. 
 
3.1 Reorganization outside Bankruptcy or in Bankruptcy 
In any case of either outside bankruptcy or in bankruptcy, a firm can restructure its 
liabilities in several ways. It can exchange new securities for existing securities, solicit 
security holder's consent to modify the terms of existing securities, or repurchase 
existing securities for cash.  Each technique requires the firm to persuade its security 
holders to alter the terms of their investment in the firm. The more complex the debtor's 
structure is, the less likely out-of-count restructuring is to work.  
In Korea, “Composition” and “Workout” became the tools for reorganization outside 
bankruptcy since 1997. As a tool of reorganization in bankruptcy, court receivership has 
been established and applied for financially distressed firm.  
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3.2 Liquidation in Bankruptcy 
When the prospects for reorganizing a debtor are so poor that it would be unreasonable 
to invest further time and financial resources in the effort, the only alternative is 
liquidation. The firm or its creditors files a petition under bankruptcy law.  
Liquidation is preferable to reorganization when selling the debtor’s assets in liquidation 
would produce value that exceeds the debtor’s reorganization value. 
Usually, the key variables are time and risk. For instance, the financial advisors of the 
debtor may believe that the realizable economic value of the debtor will eventually 
exceed the liquidation value. But suppose the value to be realized and the time it would 
take are highly uncertain. In that case, the expected present value of the debtor’s assets 
as a going concern might be less than their currently realizable liquidation values. 
Liquidation value does not necessarily mean the amount of cash to the debtor's estate 
would realize through a forced sale of the debtor's assets. 
Rather, it refers to the amount that could be realized through an orderly sale. 
Liquidation value is usually lower than reorganization value. For example, inventories 
of items that are protected by manufacturer warranties are heavily discounted in 
liquidation. This discount is part of the substantial indirect costs of financial distress. 
Liquidation value must generally be estimated asset class by asset class.  
The aggregate liquidation value of all the debtor's assets, less the costs of the liquidation 
process, is then compared to the reorganization values.  
Reorganization value can be estimated by applying the valuation techniques. 
(D.R Emery & J.D Finnerty, 1997) 
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4. Forecasting of Financial Distress in Advance through Z-Score Model 
 
As a firm’s financial condition worsens, it begins to show signs of financial distress. 
Losses begin to occur. Interest coverage worsens. The firm’s operations start to absorb 
more cash than they generate. Net working capital may turn negative.  
The deterioration reveals itself in a worsening of the firm’s key financial ratios.  
Thus changes in a firm’s financial ratios can be used to predict the onset of financial 
distress. 
Almost without exception, early studies that used financial ratios to predict corporate 
bankruptcy tried to a single financial ratio that worked best.  
But it seems unlikely that any single financial ratio will work for all industries and all 
situations.  
Multiple discriminant analysis is a more appropriate technique for predicting corporate 
bankruptcy, because it uses more than one variable. (Altman Edward, 1993) 
One of the most famous multiple discriminant analysis is Altman’s Z-score model.  
 
4.1 Z-score Formula 
Edward Altman developed a Z-score model based on five financial ratios. The formula 
is as follows.  
Z = 0.012 X1 + 0.014 X2 + 0.033 X3 + 0.006 X4 + 0.999 X5 
Where, X1 = net working capital / total assets 
X2 = retained earnings / total assets 
X3 = EBIT / total assets 
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X4 = market value of equity /book value of total liabilities 
X5 = sales / total assets  
(D.R Emery & J.D Finnerty, 1997) 
X1 can be said to represent a level of firm’s liquidity.  
Stability of a firm can be measured by X2, because retained earning shows a firm’s 
historical profitability and current financial leverage level.  
X3 is a variable in connection with current profitability of a firm.  
Through X4, a firm’s possibility of growth can be implied, because stock price reflects a 
firm’s future profitability.  
X5 can explain a firm’s effective activities through turnover ratio.    
Therefore, Z-score model considers liquidity, stability, profitability, growth rate, and 
turnover ratios, which are the key factors for corporate analysis. 
 
4.2 Prediction of Z-score 
The discriminant function transforms the individual financial ratios into single 
discriminant score, Z-score. The Z-score is then used to classify the firm as “bankrupt” 
or “non-bankrupt”. In this equation, the figures like 0.012, 0.014 and so on are 
discriminant coefficients, or weights, and X1, X2 and so on are the financial ratios. The 
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<Table 1 : Prediction of Altman’s original model>  
Z-score Prediction 
Z > 2.99 Firm will not fail within 1 year 
1.81 ≤ Z ≤ 2.99 Gray area within which it is difficult to discriminate 
effectively 
Z < 1.81 Firm will fail within 1 year 
(D.R Emery & J.D Finnerty, 1997) 
Studies have found the Z-score model is not accurate when it is used to predict 
bankruptcy in more recent time period. The mix of variables and the coefficient values 
tend to change over time. There are two suggestions. Anyone who uses a Z-score model 
should restimate the discriminant function regularly to ensure that it is up to date. 
Second, a Z-score model is likely to be most reliable when it is applied to firms within 
particular industry.   
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III. Analysis of Financial Distress of Midopa  
 
1. Overview of Midopa Department store 
 
1.1 Background Information  
Midopa, with 44 years of history, was one of the pioneering department stores in Korea 
with Shinsegae. Since it opened in 1954, Midopa entered Daenong Group as a 
subsidiary company and it reopened under the form of direct management in 1973. 
Then, Midopa after acquiring Sidae department store in 1974 and Kagopa department 
store in 1978, it opened Chonyangri to complete preparing to become the leader in the 
retailing industry. After that, Midopa expanded its size through acquiring Midopa 
Construction Co. in 1985 and eventually became a major company in Daenong group 
through opening Sangye store.  
Chairman Park, Young-man, who took his post in '89 followed by Park, Yong-hak, a 
founder, vociferously focused on expanding its size. As a result, Midopa became a big 
company with 8 subsidiary companies including advertising consulting company 
Metrocom, Midopa Tourist company, Jetline, Metro Product, etc. 
Although the number of Midopa's stores increased after opening Chunchon branch in 
'96, it was short of capital mainly because of the increased capital demand from its 
subsidiaries and excessive cross payment guarantee for Daenong Corp., which was 
already financially in distress.  
Having targeted this weak point, Sindongbang Group, collaborated with Sungwon 
Group, tried to acquire Midopa through hostile M&A at the early of 1998. Midopa, in 
order to prevent from being acquired, spent 120 billion won, and this caused a serious 
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lack in capital in other subsidiaries let alone Midopa itself like a backfire, which finally 
destroyed the entire Daenong Group.  
Last May in 1998, Midopa had been initially blacklisted as "a company needed to be in 
the financial risk" with other subsidiaries like Daenong Corp., Daenong Heavy & 
Chemical, Metro product. Although Midopa survived even in the situation the other 
subsidiaries were determined court receivership or selling their major assets, it 
eventually got fallen down without overcoming sales decrease and the pressure from 
high interest rate since the IMF crisis.  
The number of regular employees of this company is 1,800 and major trading 
companies are about 1,600 companies. 
 
1.2 Brief History 
1964 Established 
1974 Merge with Sidae department store 
1975 Initial Public Offering 
1978 Acquisition of Kagopa department store 
1979 Chongnyangri store open 
1985 Merge with Daenong construction 
1992 Sangye store open 
1994 Equity participation (45%) in Nowon Cable Broadcasting 
1996 Establishment of Chunchon Midopa & Midopa Food System 
1997 Equity participation (93%) in Spametro 
1998 Default in payment (3. 18) 
Petition for filing in court (5. 8) 
Decided an asset freezing (5. 19) 
Filing accepted by court (9. 11) 
1999 Reorganization plan accepted (5. 17) 
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1.3 Stock Price Trend 
From 1996, stock price has been sharply down, which implies that the market predicted 
the crisis of Midopa in advance.  
Despite a negative equity in 1998, the stock price is not zero, which can be explained by 
investors' speculative expectation on the possibility of Midopa's revival.  
After a court receivership was accepted in 1999, the stock price increased reflecting the 
possibility of successful reorganization. 
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2. Causes and Occurrence of Financial Distress 
 
2.1 Review of Financial Statement 
2.1.1 Income Statement 
Income Statement of Midopa from 1995 to 1999 shows that sales have declined since 
1996. The sales revenue of 1999 is just a half volume compared with that of 1995. 
Because of decreased sales and increased SG&A, operating income has plummeted to a 
negative point for two years, 1997 and 1998. The amount of extraordinary loss, resulted 
from unusually increased provision for potential loan loss ('97: 5,215 ⇒'98: 117,798 
million won) increased to 12,579 million won in 1998 from 681 million won in 1997. 
There was unusual other non-operating expense due to a loss through investment asset 













<Data 1 : Historical Income Statement> historical
Income Statement
(unit : million won)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Revenue 548,480 640,322 569,515 359,774 278,776
  - COGS 386,390 456,943 440,323 273,180 200,809
   (Depreciation) 5,650 7,083 7,596 6,899 6,979
Gross profit 156,440 176,296 121,596 79,695 70,988
  - SG&A 111,454 122,864 130,646 202,826 56,479
Operating Profit 44,986 53,432 (9,050) (123,131) 14,509
  + Interest earning 13,187 11,620 16,793 30,681 1,217
  + Other non-operating income 2,262 3,676 10,494 27,855 4,179
  - Interst expenses 49,814 61,137 76,339 104,684 37,417
  - Amortization 1,491 1,459 1,377 2,562 1,404
   - Other non-operating expenses 1,394 917 6,543 107,230 248,037
Ordinary Profit 7,736 5,215 (66,022) (279,071) (266,953)
  + Extraordinary income 4 265 255 511 50,013
  - Extraordinary loss 30 59 681 12,579 1,483
Net income before tax 7,710 5,421 (66,448) (291,139) (218,423)
  - Corporate tax 3,941 2,278
Net income aftr tax 3,769 3,143 (66,448) (291,139) (218,423)
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2.1.2 Balance Sheet 
Midopa's asset has rapidly declined since 1997 mainly due to selling investment asset 
and reducing account receivables. Paid in Capital has increased through issuing new 
shares during 1997 & 1998. Shifting to the deficit, retained earning has continuously 
decreased since 1997 due to huge net loss. Negative equity from 1998 was caused by 


















<Data 2 : Historical Balance Sheet> historical
Balance Sheet
(unit : million won)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
<Current asset> 232,514 309,514 385,276 64,905 88,601
Cash equivalent 16,719 19,233 47,220 14,242 40,755
Account receivable 143,273 219,986 266,295 21,282 14,272
Inventory 60,981 55,526 56,108 26,369 28,559
Others 11,541 14,769 15,653 3,012 5,015
<Fixed asset> 358,779 436,956 582,904 724,616 487,355
Investment asset 106,464 157,957 230,714 274,711 45,095
Tangible asset 242,779 270,702 344,908 441,093 436,927
Intangible asset 9,536 8,297 7,282 8,812 5,333
Total asset 591,293 746,470 968,180 789,521 575,956
<Current liabilities> 248,111 335,682 466,328 629,202 141,126
Short-term debt 88,712 146,870 182,642 264,210 0
Account payable 92,474 84,847 83,068 93,881 98,754
Others 66,925 103,965 200,618 271,111 42,372
<Fixed liabilities> 251,902 321,034 361,180 190,157 688,715
Long-term debt 226,755 294,005 327,794 168,858 675,040
Others 25,147 27,029 33,386 21,299 13,675
Total liabilities 500,013 656,716 827,508 819,359 829,841
<Equity> 91,280 89,754 140,672 (29,838) (253,885)
Paid-in-capital 51,972 51,972 75,150 93,740 93,740
Capital surplus 29,886 29,886 116,170 162,939 162,963
Retained earning 7,003 5,477 (61,816) (286,517) (507,841)
Capital adjustment 2,419 2,419 11,168 0 (2,747)
Total liabilitiesand equity 591,293 746,470 968,180 789,521 575,956
balance check 0 0 0 0 0
debt to equity ratio 548% 732% 588% -2746% -327%
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2.2 Causes of Financial Distress 
2.2.1 Unwise Expansion from 1994 
Midopa started to expend the size of firm in 1994 by acquisition of Nowon Cable 
Broadcasting's equity to 45%. Sine then, Midopa's acquisition became even more active. 
In 1996, establishing a fully owned subsidiary Midopa Food system as a starting point, 
there has been a series of expending activities. They are respectively 84.5% of equity 
contribution in Hanmae soft co. in 1996, 50% in Daenong Petrochemicals in 1996, and 
93% in Spametro corp. in 1997. Those M&A activities were not relevant to Midopa’s 
core business. 
2.2.2 Intense Competition 
Department store and retailing industry have faced an intense competition. First of all, 
increasing discount stores and multinational retail seller's entrance into domestic retail 
market produced a fierce price competition. Also, as the significance of e-commerce has 
been emphasized and this e-commerce has been considered a potential substitute for the 
existing retail store, competition has been intensified. In addition, a few chaebols' 
entrance into market such as LG (Boochon) and Daewoo (Masan) and the introduction 
of open price system by loosened government regulation caused another competition.  
As a consequence, the market share of Midopa has decreased as follows.  
<Table2 : Market Share Trend> 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Market Share 14.7% 9.95% 9.68% 7.96% 
2.2.3 Poor Management 
After opening Chunchon branch in 1996, Midopa was lack of capital. Having targeted 
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this weak point, Sindongbang Group, collaborated with Sungwon Group, tried to 
acquire Midopa through hostile M&A at the early of 1998. Midopa, in order to prevent 
from being acquired, spent 120 billion won, and this caused a serious lack in capital in 
other subsidiaries let alone itself like a backfire, which finally destroyed the entire 
Daenong Group.  
And about 900 billion won cross loan payment guarantee for affiliated companies of 
Daenong Group triggered Midopa's distress.  
2.2.4 Too Much Debt 
Due to high debt to equity ratio, the amount of interest payment is larger than of 
operating profit.  
<Table 3 : Increasing D/E ratio> 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
548% 732% 588% Negative Equity 
<Table 4 : Interest payment/operating Profit> 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
111% 114% Negative Operating Profit 
2.2.5 Others 
Among many other factors besides these internal factors the most influential one was 
rapid sales decrease due to the domestic economic recession since the financial crisis at 
the end of 1997. 
This financial crisis created a domestic liquidity crunch, so that difficulties in 
recollecting the account receivable from customers who bought the goods in credit basis 
got heightened and tightened working capital of Midopa. 
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2.3. Occurrence of Financial Distress 
Midopa failed to repay the commercial paper of 17.1 billion won due on March. 18, 
1998 due to several causes mentioned before. Here, it is important to know whether 
Midopa’s insolvency was “Flow Based” of “Stock Based”. If it is “Flow Based” 
insolvency, just short-term capital injection through creditors’ support can be effective. 
However, if it is “Stock Based” insolvency, a fundamental evaluation on the firm is 
required, because creditors should decide whether Midopa has to be liquidated or 
continue its business with restructuring process.  
2.3.1 Negative Equity (“Stock Based”) 
Turning to negative equity from 1998, which was affected by decrease in assets and 
increase in debt, was mainly due to huge amount of provision. The huge amount of 
provision was resulted form guarantee for insolvent affiliated companies. 
<Table 5 : Trend of financial status> 
 (Unit : billion won) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Assets 591 946 968 789 
Liabilities 500 656 827 819 
Equity 91 89 140 -29 
2.3.2 Cash Flow Shortage (“Flow Based”) 
Prior to turning to negative equity in terms of book value, Midopa failed to repay the 
commercial paper of 17.1 billion won due on March. 18, 1998. At that time banks began 
to deny revolving of outstanding loans as well as new lending.   
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2.3.3 Judgment 
Apparently, Midopa’s case is mixed with flow-based insolvency and stock-based 
insolvency. However, even though cash flow shortage occurred before negative equity 
in terms of book value, maybe market value of assets were probably less than debt value, 
which is possibly estimated by some Korean firms’ practice of window dressing. 
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3. Forecasting of Financial Distress in Advance 
 
3.1 Comparison of Financial Data with Industry Average  
Except “Tangible asset / Sales”, all the other ratios are below industry average. 
Declining of sales growth was attributed to poor marketing strategy of Midopa and 
increase in competition with new entrants. 
Low turnover ratios of account receivable, investment assets, tangible assets came from 
inefficient asset management, which was a main factor to weaken cash flow.  
High interest rate implied Midopa’s high-risk premium and involved high bankruptcy 
cost, which was caused by poor financial management.  
Overall, Midopa lost competitiveness in retailing industry and recorded poor 
performance, which was a signal of financial distress.  
<Table 6 : Ratio comparison> 
Items Industry Average Midopa 
① Sales Growth 11.7% -13.4% 
② Account Receivables / Sales 12.2% 40.6% 
③ Investment Assets / Sales 12.0% 39.4% 
④ Tangible Assets / Sales 139.7% 71.2% 
⑤ Interest rate 11.8% 14.4% 
 
3.2 Z-Score Application of Midopa Case  
The Z-score model, multiple discriminant analysis, can be calculated based on Midopa’s 
publicly announced financial data as following table.   
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<Table 7 : Calculation of Z-score> 
    (Unit : billion won)
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total assets 591.3  746.5  968.2  789.5  576.0  
Net working capital 111.8  190.7  239.3  -46.2  -55.9  
Retained earnings 7.0  5.5  -61.8  -286.5  -507.8  
EBIT -9.4  -8.1  -7.0  -6.1  -5.3  
Number of stocks (million) 10.5  10.5  15.0  18.7  18.7  
Stock price (won) 10,600  12,500  6,000  310  875  
Market value of equity 111.3  131.2  90.0  5.7  16.3  
Total liabilities 500.0  656.7  8927.5  819.3  8293.8  
Sales 241.4  209.0  181.0  156.7  135.7  
X1 18.907  25.546  24.716  -5.852  -9.705  
X2 1.184  0.737  -6.383  -36.289  -88.160  
X3 -1.590  -1.085  -0.723  -0.773  -0.920  
X4 22.260  19.979  1.008  0.696  0.197  
X5 0.408  0.280  0.187  0.198  0.236  
Z-Score 0.780  0.713  0.398  -0.378  -1.117  
 X1 = net working capital / total assets 
X2 = retained earnings / total assets 
X3 = EBIT / total assets 
X4 = market value of equity /book value of total liabilities 
X5 = sales / total assets  
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According to Altman’s original Z-score model’s prediction, Midopa had been predicted 
to fail within 1 year, because the score is below 1.81.  
If it is simply applied, Midopa’s financial distress was forecasted from 1995. Then the 
situation was worsened afterwards. 
However, because the model is made based on the US firms’ performance, it may not be 
adequate to apply to Korean firms. Especially due to high debt to equity ratio and 
emphasis on sales rather than profit, which were the ordinary Korean firms’ status and 
behavior in the past, Korean firms can not achieve high Z-Score. 
Although Midopa cannot be evaluated well through Z-Score model, its Z-score is too 
low which mainly resulted from negative working capital, negative EBIT, and negative 
retained earnings. 
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IV. Valuation and Restructuring of Midopa 
 
1. Forecasting of Liquidation Value 
1.1 Use of Liquidation Value 
Liquidation value is the amount of cash to be resulted through orderly sale of creditor’s 
assets. Liquidation value comparing to reorganization value as going concern gives 
basic information to creditor whether the firm should be liquidated or continue its 
operation in order to minimize the creditor’s loss. 
1.2 Evaluation of Midopa’s Assets 
The evaluation is based on general practice of accounting and reasonable adjustment. 
Book value was quoted from annual report of 1999. 
1.2.2 Cash & Cash Equivalent 
There is no factor to discount the asset value, because cash is cash itself and cash 
equivalent can be converted into cash without devaluation in most cases.  
<Table 8 : Liquidation Value of Cash & Cash Equivalent>         
 (Unit : million won) 
 Book value Adjustment Market value 
Cash 903 0 903 
Demand deposit 10,875 0 10,875 
CD 290 0 290 
Saving deposit 28,448 0 28,448 
Other deposit 238 0 238 
Sum 40,756 0 40,756 
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1.2.3. Account Receivables 
Provision for potential loan loss was reflected in book value. However, about 1% of 
provision was applied in trading credit amount. In consideration that most trading credit 
were occurred from transaction with affiliated companies who have also difficulties of 
financial distress, 1% of provision is too small. So, in calculating the market value, at 
least 30% of provision should be applied. 
<Table 9 : Liquidation Value of Account receivables>               
 (Unit : million won) 
 Book value Adjustment Market value 
Trading credit 10,418 - 30% 7,293 
Others ------- ------- ------- 
Sum 14,272 - 3,125 11,147 
1.2.4 Inventories 
The value of inventories can be calculated by assessment of quantities and price 
<Table 10: Liquidation Value of Cash & Cash Equivalent>          
    (Unit : million won) 
 Book value Adjustment Market value 
Inventories 28,559 - 50% 14,280 
According to Midopa annual report, quantities of inventories are determined by site 
investigation at the end of fiscal year. 
Price of inventories should be the real price connected with actual sales price, which can 
be considered the market price in normal business situation. 
However, It was general that inventories were sold at the significantly discounted price 
in case of liquidation. So, 50% discount is applied to calculate the imaginary market 
value of inventories. 
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1.2.5 Other Current Assets 
There is no factor to discount the assets value, because the other current assets were 
mainly consisted with pre-paid expenses. 
<Table 11 : Liquidation Value of Other Current Assets>      
     (Unit : million won) 
 Book value Adjustment Market value 
Other current assets 5,015 0 5,015 
1.2.6 Investment Assets 
In the annual report, investment securities have already been adjusted after deducting 
the value of insolvent affiliated companies. 
Long-term lending was provided to affiliated companies, which are currently insolvent, 
and it is very uncertain for Midopa to be repaid the total amount of lending. So, 80% 
discount is applied. 
<Table 12 : Liquidation Value of Cash & Cash Equivalent>   
     (Unit : million won) 
 Book value Adjustment Market value 
Long-term deposit 2,225 0 2,225 
Special deposit 230 0 230 
Investment securities 2,205 0 2,205 
Long-term lending 31,585 - 80% 6,317 
Others ------ ----- ------ 
Sum 45,095 - 25,268 19,827 
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1.2.7 Tangible Assets 
Midopa conducted asset revaluation several times and adjusted their asset value to be 
similar to market value.  
However, in insolvent situation, it is inevitable for Midopa to sell their tangible asset at 
discounted price. Especially tangible assets like land, buildings are not easily sold in the 
short run. Also it is very difficult to find proper buyers who are willing to pay for the 
asset at fair price. Normally, assets of insolvent firm were sold through public auction in 
a court in which the average discount was 40%. So, 40% discount for land and building 
is applied. 
Facilities and vehicles are also difficult to be sold, because the usage of assets is quite 
limited. 50% discount is applied here. 
Construction project stopped due to financial distress of Midopa, which result in the 
significant value destruction of under construction assets. 80% discount for under 
construction assets is applied. 
<Table 13 : Liquidation Value of Tangible Assets>    
     (Unit : million won) 
 Book value Adjustment Market value 
Land 243,248 -40% 145,949 
Building 162,781 -40% 97,669 
Facilities 8,128 -50% 4,064 
Vehicles 75 -50% 38 
Under construction 13,278 -80% 2,656 
Others 9,354 -20% 7,483 
Sum 436,926 -179,006 257,858 
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1.2.8 Intangible Assets 
There is little factor to discount the assets value, because the large portion of intangible 
asset come form the right of road usage which was provided by city authority for 
Midopa’s contribution in the road construction. 
<Table 14 : Liquidation Value of Intangible Assets>   
    (Unit : million won) 
 Book value Adjustment Market value 
Intangible assets 5,333 0 5,333 
 
1.3 Total Imaginary Liquidation Value 
Even though assessment process applied above tables contains objective assumption, 
the imaginary liquidation value of Midopa is 354,216 million won.  
<Table 15 : Sum of Liquidation Value>      
 (Unit : million won) 
 Book value Adjustment Market value 
Cash & cash equivalent 40,756 0 40,756 
Account receivables 14,272 - 3,125 11,147 
Inventories 28,559 -14,280 14,280 
Other current assets 5,015 0 5,015 
Investment assets 45,095 - 25,268 19,827 
Tangible assets 436,926 -179,006 257,858 
Intangible assets 5,333 0 5,333 
Sum 575,956 - 221,679 354,216 
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2. Forecasting of Reorganization Value as Going Concern  
 
Reorganization value can be estimated by applying the valuation technique. Normally 
discount cash flow technique is adopted. Here, simplified financial model is been 
making to calculate net present value (NPV). Four scenarios are assumed in financial 
model. Starting from scenario #1 to #4, financial models are developed to achieve  the 
more positive results. 
 
2.1 Quotation of Financial Statement and Starting Point of Valuation 
Here, the annual report of Midopa as of 1999 was used, in which Midopa’s business 
activities are stipulated during the fiscal year, from July 1998 to June 1999. 
The reorganization process of Midopa through court receivership is started from May 
1999. So, the annual report of 1999 did not influenced by reorganization. Even though 
Midopa was insolvent in May 1998 due to failure to pay its financial obligation on due 
date, it is possible to evaluate Midopa’s value as at the end of June 1999. 
Therefore, the period of historical performance ends in 1999 and future forecasting is 
begun form 2000. 
 
2.2 Structure of Financial Model 
Most of the value drivers used in the financial model are linked to “Sales” except 
“Depreciation”, “Amortization”’ “Interest payment”’ “Interest earning”, and “Tax” in 
the income statement. “Depreciation” and “Amortization” are calculated based on 
“tangible assets” and “Intangible assets” respectively. “Interest payment” “Interest 
earning” are linked to “interest bearing liabilities” and “Cash and cash equivalent” 
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respectively. In balance sheet, “Cash and cash equivalent” and “Long-term debt” are 
used as a plug to balance the credit and debit side. 
Most of the ratios used in basic assumptions are determined by average of Midopa 
historical data for last 4 years and average of Department store industry’s historical data 
for last 3 years. Detailed basic assumption is explained in each scenario.    
Discount rate is determined to calcula te the net present value including terminal value 
based on weighted average cost of capital (WACC). However, 100% leverage ratio is 
used due to negative equity, which dose not result in any effect on cost of equity. In case 
of valuation for financially distressed firm, we can say the creditor is the only investor. 
So, the creditor’s rate of required return could be the rate of expected return for the firm. 
Cost of debt is based on the interest payment rate in financial model. 
Explicit forecasting year id from 2000 to 2004 and terminal value is calculated based on 
the free cash flow of last explicit forecasting year, 2004. 
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2.3 Scenario #1 of Reorganization Value 
2.3.1 Assumption 
Here, simple average of Midopa’s historical performance is used as value drivers for 
forecasting. 
Sales growth rate is negative. The sum of COGS (cost of good sold) and SG&A (sales 
and general administration expenses) exceeds sales, in which we cannot expect positive 
value of the firm. 
The average figures are affected by the performance of IMF era. Some figures in 1998 
and 1999 are quite different form the figures of previous years.  
 
 
<Data3 : Assumption of Scenario #1> Forecasting
Basic Assumption from Historical Data of Midopa
1996 1997 1998 1999 Average
Sales growth 16.7% -11.1% -36.8% -22.5% -13.4%
COGS / Sales 71.4% 77.3% 75.9% 72.0% 74.2%
SG&A / Sales 19.2% 22.9% 56.4% 20.3% 29.7%
Non-operating income / Sales 0.6% 1.8% 7.7% 1.5% 2.9%
Non-operating expenses / Sales 0.1% 1.1% 29.8% 89.0% 30.0%
Extraordinary income / Sales 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 17.9% 4.5%
Extraordinary loss / Sales 0.0% 0.1% 3.5% 0.5% 1.0%
Depreciation 2.6% 2.2% 1.6% 1.6% 2.0%
Amortization 17.6% 18.9% 29.1% 26.3% 23.0%
Account receivable / Sales 34.4% 46.8% 5.9% 5.1% 23.0%
Inventory / Sales 8.7% 9.9% 7.3% 10.2% 9.0%
Other current asset / Sales 2.3% 2.7% 0.8% 1.8% 1.9%
Investment asset / Sales 24.7% 40.5% 76.4% 16.2% 39.4%
Tangible asset / Sales 42.3% 60.6% 122.6% 156.7% 95.5%
Intangible asset / Sales 1.3% 1.3% 2.4% 1.9% 1.7%
Account Payable / Sales  13.3% 14.6% 26.1% 35.4% 22.3%
Other current liabilities / Sales 16.2% 35.2% 75.4% 15.2% 35.5%
Other fixed liabilities / Sales 4.2% 5.9% 5.9% 4.9% 5.2%
Interest rate for payment 13.9% 15.0% 24.2% 5.5% 14.6%
Interest rate for earning 10.0%
Dividend payout ratio 0.0%
Tax rate 31.0%
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2.3.2 Income Statement 
Due to negative sales growth, sales revenue decrease as time goes by. Operating profit 
shows negative figure. The firm should pay the huge amount of interest expenses. 















<Data 4 : Income Statement of Scenario #1> Forecasting
Income Statement
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Revenue 241,382 209,004 180,968 156,694 135,675
  - COGS 179,009 154,997 134,206 116,204 100,617
   (Depreciation) 4,601 3,984 3,449 2,987 2,586
Gross profit 57,772 50,023 43,313 37,503 32,472
  - SG&A 71,668 62,055 53,731 46,524 40,283
Operating Profit (13,896) (12,032) (10,418) (9,021) (7,811)
  + Interest earning 0 0 0 0 0
  + Other non-operating income 7,035 6,091 5,274 4,567 3,954
  - Interst expenses 99,901 121,716 146,641 175,295 208,390
  - Amortization 962 833 721 624 541
   - Other non-operating expenses 72,457 62,738 54,322 47,036 40,727
Ordinary Profit (180,181) (191,227) (206,828) (227,409) (253,514)
  + Extraordinary income 10,964 9,493 8,220 7,117 6,163
  - Extraordinary loss 2,509 2,172 1,881 1,628 1,410
Net income before tax (171,726) (183,906) (200,489) (221,920) (248,761)
  - Corporate tax 0 0 0 0 0
Net income aftr tax (171,726) (183,906) (200,489) (221,920) (248,761)
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2.3.3 Balance Sheet 
In this scenario, liabilities are always bigger than assets. Due to the loss occurred, the 
negative figures in retained earnings are getting bigger. Accordingly, the firm needs to 
borrow more money, which is linked to the increase in long-term debt. According to 
sales decrease, it is assumed for the firm to sell the assets, which explains the decrease 
in current and fixed assets. 
<Data 5 : Balance Sheet of Scenario #1> Forecasting
Balance Sheet
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
<Current asset> 82,032 71,028 61,501 53,251 46,108
Cash equivalent 0 0 0 0 0
Account receivable 55,608 48,148 41,690 36,098 31,256
Inventory 21,783 18,861 16,331 14,141 12,244
Others 4,641 4,019 3,480 3,013 2,609
<Fixed asset> 329,981 285,718 247,393 214,208 185,475
Investment asset 95,172 82,406 71,352 61,781 53,494
Tangible asset 230,623 199,688 172,902 149,710 129,628
Intangible asset 4,186 3,624 3,138 2,717 2,353
Total asset 412,012 356,746 308,893 267,459 231,583
<Current liabilities> 139,623 120,894 104,678 90,637 78,479
Short-term debt 0 0 0 0 0
Account payable 53,922 46,689 40,426 35,003 30,308
Others 85,701 74,206 64,252 55,633 48,171
<Fixed liabilities> 695,253 842,622 1,011,475 1,206,002 1,431,045
Long-term debt 682,636 831,697 1,002,015 1,197,812 1,423,953
Others 12,618 10,925 9,460 8,191 7,092
Total liabilities 834,876 963,516 1,116,153 1,296,639 1,509,524
<Equity> (422,864) (606,770) (807,259) (1,029,180) (1,277,941)
Paid-in-capital 93,740 93,740 93,740 93,740 93,740
Capital surplus 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963
Retained earning (679,567) (863,473) (1,063,962) (1,285,883) (1,534,644)
Capital adjustment 0 0 0 0 0
Total liabilitiesand equity 412,012 356,746 308,893 267,459 231,583
balance check 0 0 0 0 0
debt to equity ratio -197% -159% -138% -126% -118%
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2.3.4 Valuation 
Both present value from 2000 to 2004 and terminal value are negative. NPV is –
881,401 million won, which is resulted by decrease in sales and negative operating 
income. 
This scenario #1 shows that there is no reason for the firm to continue its operation. 
However, the assumption based on simple average is not appropriate, because abnormal 
years of IMF era are included in average calculation. 
<Data 6 : Valuation of Scenario #1> Forecasting
Valuation
Free cash flow
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Profit after tax (171,726) (183,906) (200,489) (221,920) (248,761)
  + Depreciation 4,601 3,984 3,449 2,987 2,586
  + Amortization 962 833 721 624 541
  + After-tax interest payment 68,932 83,984 101,182 120,954 143,789
  - Increase in current assets (6,569) (11,003) (9,528) (8,250) (7,143)
  + Increase in current liabilities (1,503) (18,729) (16,216) (14,041) (12,158)
  - Increase in fixed assets at cost (157,374) (44,263) (38,325) (33,184) (28,733)
  + Increase in fixed liabilities (1,057) (1,692) (1,465) (1,269) (1,099)
Free cash flow 64,152 (60,261) (64,966) (71,232) (79,226)
Cost of capital
Cost of debt 14.6%
Cost of equity




1. Existing cash at the end of 1999 40,755
2. Present value from 2000 to 2004 (137,580)
3. Terminal value after 2004 (784,577)
4. Net present value (881,401)
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2.4 Scenario #2 of Reorganization Value 
2.4.1 Assumption 
In order to avoid distorted average resulted from years of abnormal performance during 



























<Data 7 : Assumption of Scenario #2> Forecasting
Basic Assumption from Historical Data of Midopa excluding abnormal performance
1996 1997 1998 1999 Average
Sales growth 16.7% -11.1% -36.8% -22.5% -13.4%
COGS / Sales 71.4% 77.3% 75.9% 72.0% 74.2%
SG&A / Sales (1) 19.2% 22.9% 56.4% 20.3% 20.8%
Non-operating income / Sales 0.6% 1.8% 7.7% 1.5% 2.9%
Non-operating expenses / Sales (2) 0.1% 1.1% 29.8% 89.0% 0.6%
Extraordinary income / Sales (3) 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 17.9% 0.1%
Extraordinary loss / Sales (4) 0.0% 0.1% 3.5% 0.5% 0.2%
Depreciation 2.6% 2.2% 1.6% 1.6% 2.0%
Amortization 17.6% 18.9% 29.1% 26.3% 23.0%
Account receivable / Sales (5) 34.4% 46.8% 5.9% 5.1% 40.6%
Inventory / Sales 8.7% 9.9% 7.3% 10.2% 9.0%
Other current asset / Sales 2.3% 2.7% 0.8% 1.8% 1.9%
Investment asset / Sales 24.7% 40.5% 76.4% 16.2% 39.4%
Tangible asset / Sales (6) 42.3% 60.6% 122.6% 156.7% 139.7%
Intangible asset / Sales 1.3% 1.3% 2.4% 1.9% 1.7%
Account Payable / Sales  (7) 13.3% 14.6% 26.1% 35.4% 13.9%
Other current liabilities / Sales (8) 16.2% 35.2% 75.4% 15.2% 22.2%
Other fixed liabilities / Sales 4.2% 5.9% 5.9% 4.9% 5.2%
Interest rate for payment (9) 13.9% 15.0% 24.2% 5.5% 14.4%
Interest rate for earning 10.0%
Dividend payout ratio 0.0%
Tax rate 31.0%
(1) SG&A / Sales excluding 1998 performance  due to abnormal provision for liabilities
(2) Non-operating expenses / Sales excluding abnormal performance of  1998 & 1999 
(3) Extraordinary income / Sales excluding abnormal performance of  1998 
(4) Extraordinary loss / Sales excluding abnormal performance of  1998 
(5) Account receivable / Sales excluding abnormal performance of  1998 & 1999 
(6) Tangible asset / Sales excluding performance of  1996 & 1997 (before asset revaluation)  
(7) Account Payable / Sales excluding abnormal performance of  1998 & 1999 
(8) Other current liabilities / Sales excluding abnormal revenue decrease of  1998 
(9) Interest rate for payment excluding abnormal financial condition of  1998 & 1999 
 - 36- 
2.4.2 Income Statement 
Operating profit is occurred. Yet, net income is still negative due to the huge amount of 
interest expenses. 
<Data 8 : Income Statement of Scenario #2> Forecasting
Income Statement
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Revenue 241,382 209,004 180,968 156,694 135,675
  - COGS 179,009 154,997 134,206 116,204 100,617
   (Depreciation) 6,726 5,824 5,043 4,366 3,780
Gross profit 55,647 48,183 41,720 36,123 31,278
  - SG&A 50,197 43,464 37,634 32,586 28,215
Operating Profit 5,450 4,719 4,086 3,538 3,063
  + Interest earning 0 0 0 0 0
  + Other non-operating income 7,035 6,091 5,274 4,567 3,954
  - Interst expenses 118,284 126,387 137,440 151,726 169,605
  - Amortization 962 833 721 624 541
   - Other non-operating expenses 1,559 1,350 1,169 1,012 877
Ordinary Profit (108,320) (117,760) (129,970) (145,258) (164,004)
  + Extraordinary income 184 159 138 119 103
  - Extraordinary loss 532 460 399 345 299
Net income before tax (108,668) (118,062) (130,231) (145,484) (164,200)
  - Corporate tax 0 0 0 0 0
Net income aftr tax (108,668) (118,062) (130,231) (145,484) (164,200)
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2.4.3 Balance Sheet 
Still total liabilities exceed total assets due to negative equity coming from accumulated 
losses. 
<Data 9 : Balance Sheet of Scenario #2> Forecasting
Balance Sheet
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
<Current asset> 124,321 107,645 93,206 80,704 69,878
Cash equivalent 0 0 0 0 0
Account receivable 97,897 84,765 73,395 63,550 55,026
Inventory 21,783 18,861 16,331 14,141 12,244
Others 4,641 4,019 3,480 3,013 2,609
<Fixed asset> 436,488 377,939 327,243 283,348 245,340
Investment asset 95,172 82,406 71,352 61,781 53,494
Tangible asset 337,130 291,908 252,753 218,849 189,493
Intangible asset 4,186 3,624 3,138 2,717 2,353
Total asset 560,809 485,584 420,449 364,051 315,218
<Current liabilities> 87,233 75,531 65,400 56,627 49,031
Short-term debt 0 0 0 0 0
Account payable 33,596 29,090 25,188 21,809 18,884
Others 53,636 46,442 40,212 34,818 30,148
<Fixed liabilities> 833,383 887,920 963,148 1,061,006 1,183,969
Long-term debt 820,765 876,995 953,688 1,052,815 1,176,877
Others 12,618 10,925 9,460 8,191 7,092
Total liabilities 920,615 963,451 1,028,547 1,117,633 1,233,000
<Equity> (359,806) (477,868) (608,099) (753,582) (917,782)
Paid-in-capital 93,740 93,740 93,740 93,740 93,740
Capital surplus 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963
Retained earning (616,509) (734,571) (864,802) (1,010,285) (1,174,485)
Capital adjustment 0 0 0 0 0
Total liabilitiesand equity 560,809 485,584 420,449 364,051 315,218
balance check 0 0 0 0 0
debt to equity ratio -256% -202% -169% -148% -134%
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2.4.4 Valuation 
Now, NPV shows positive value. 
However, the terminal value is still negative which is resulted from decrease in sales 
growth and decrease in profits. 
<Data 10 : Valuation of Scenario #2> Forecasting
Valuation
Free cash flow
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Profit after tax (108,668) (118,062) (130,231) (145,484) (164,200)
  + Depreciation 6,726 5,824 5,043 4,366 3,780
  + Amortization 962 833 721 624 541
  + After-tax interest payment 81,616 87,207 94,834 104,691 117,027
  - Increase in current assets 35,720 (16,676) (14,439) (12,502) (10,825)
  + Increase in current liabilities (53,893) (11,701) (10,132) (8,773) (7,596)
  - Increase in fixed assets at cost (50,867) (58,549) (50,696) (43,895) (38,007)
  + Increase in fixed liabilities (1,057) (1,692) (1,465) (1,269) (1,099)
Free cash flow (59,168) 37,634 23,904 10,554 (2,713)
Cost of capital
Cost of debt 14.4%
Cost of equity




1. Existing cash at the end of 1999 40,755
2. Present value from 2000 to 2004 838
3. Terminal value after 2004 (27,287)
4. Net present value 14,306
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2.5 Scenario #3 of Reorganization Value 
2.5.1 Assumption 
Here, simple average of historical industry performance is used as value drivers for 




<Data 11 : Assumption of Scenario #3> Forecasting
Basic Assumption from Historical Industry Average
1996 1997 1998 1999 Average
Sales growth 13.1% 33.3% -11.2% 11.7%
COGS / Sales 75.2% 77.4% 78.3% 77.0%
SG&A / Sales 20.0% 19.6% 19.2% 19.6%
Non-operating income / Sales 0.8% 1.6% 1.8% 1.4%
Non-operating expenses / Sales 0.6% 0.8% 1.6% 1.0%
Extraordinary income / Sales 0.1% 0.5% 0.9% 0.5%
Extraordinary loss / Sales 0.0% 1.0% 1.7% 0.9%
Depreciation 3.9% 2.9% 2.9% 3.2%
Amortization 10.9% 7.2% 7.1% 8.4%
Account receivable / Sales 17.4% 12.0% 7.1% 12.2%
Inventory / Sales 14.0% 12.3% 10.5% 12.3%
Other current asset / Sales 2.0% 7.0% 5.8% 4.9%
Investment asset / Sales 13.4% 12.5% 10.2% 12.0%
Tangible asset / Sales 50.6% 66.5% 96.6% 71.2%
Intangible asset / Sales 0.1% 0.5% 0.6% 0.4%
Account Payable / Sales 23.6% 23.3% 22.1% 23.0%
Other current liabilities / Sales 12.0% 11.0% 12.7% 11.9%
Other fixed liabilities / Sales 7.6% 7.1% 9.9% 8.2%
Interest rate for payment 10.2% 11.3% 14.0% 11.8%
Interest rate for earning 8.0%
Dividend payout ratio 0.0%
Tax rate 31.0%
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2.5.2 Income Statement 
Even though we can expect some operating income, net income is still negative due to 
big interest expenses burden. 
<Data 12 : Income Statement of Scenario #3> Forecasting
Income Statement
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Revenue 311,486 348,033 388,869 434,497 485,478
  - COGS 239,740 267,870 299,300 334,418 373,656
   (Depreciation) 7,174 8,016 8,956 10,007 11,182
Gross profit 64,571 72,148 80,613 90,072 100,640
  - SG&A 61,051 68,215 76,218 85,161 95,154
Operating Profit 3,520 3,933 4,395 4,910 5,486
  + Interest earning 0 0 0 0 0
  + Other non-operating income 4,361 4,872 5,444 6,083 6,797
  - Interst expenses 62,485 73,789 86,954 102,267 120,064
  - Amortization 105 117 131 146 163
   - Other non-operating expenses 3,115 3,480 3,889 4,345 4,855
Ordinary Profit (57,823) (68,581) (81,134) (95,765) (112,799)
  + Extraordinary income 1,557 1,740 1,944 2,172 2,427
  - Extraordinary loss 2,803 3,132 3,500 3,910 4,369
Net income before tax (59,069) (69,973) (82,690) (97,503) (114,740)
  - Corporate tax 0 0 0 0 0
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2.5.3 Balance Sheet 
Resulted from accumulated losses and increase in long-term debt, total liabilities 
exceed total assets as the same with scenario #1.  
<Data 13 : Balance Sheet of Scenario #3> Forecasting
Balance Sheet
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
<Current asset> 91,473 102,206 114,198 127,597 142,569
Cash equivalent 0 0 0 0 0
Account receivable 37,897 42,344 47,312 52,864 59,066
Inventory 38,209 42,692 47,701 53,298 59,552
Others 15,367 17,170 19,184 21,435 23,950
<Fixed asset> 260,610 291,188 325,354 363,529 406,183
Investment asset 37,482 41,880 46,794 52,284 58,419
Tangible asset 221,882 247,916 277,005 309,506 345,822
Intangible asset 1,246 1,392 1,555 1,738 1,942
Total asset 352,083 393,394 439,552 491,126 548,751
<Current liabilities> 108,709 121,464 135,715 151,639 169,432
Short-term debt 0 0 0 0 0
Account payable 71,642 80,048 89,440 99,934 111,660
Others 37,067 41,416 46,275 51,705 57,772
<Fixed liabilities> 553,581 652,110 766,706 899,859 1,054,433
Long-term debt 528,040 623,572 734,819 864,231 1,014,624
Others 25,542 28,539 31,887 35,629 39,809
Total liabilities 662,290 773,574 902,422 1,051,499 1,223,865
<Equity> (310,207) (380,180) (462,870) (560,373) (675,113)
Paid-in-capital 93,740 93,740 93,740 93,740 93,740
Capital surplus 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963
Retained earning (566,910) (636,883) (719,573) (817,076) (931,816)
Capital adjustment 0 0 0 0 0
Total liabilitiesand equity 352,083 393,394 439,552 491,126 548,751
balance check 0 0 0 0 0
debt to equity ratio -213% -203% -195% -188% -181%
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2.5.4 Valuation 
The first year’s cash inflow is coming from mainly decrease in fixed assets, which is 
assumed that the firm would sell out its fixed assets in order to solve the liquidity 
problem. However, increase in operating loss resulted in negative NPV.    
<Data 14 : Valuation of Scenario #3> Forecasting
Valuation
Free cash flow
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Profit after tax (59,069) (69,973) (82,690) (97,503) (114,740)
  + Depreciation 7,174 8,016 8,956 10,007 11,182
  + Amortization 105 117 131 146 163
  + After-tax interest payment 43,114 50,915 59,998 70,564 82,844
  - Increase in current assets 2,872 10,733 11,992 13,399 14,971
  + Increase in current liabilities (32,417) 12,755 14,252 15,924 17,792
  - Increase in fixed assets at cost (226,745) 30,578 34,166 38,175 42,654
  + Increase in fixed liabilities 11,867 2,997 3,349 3,741 4,180
Free cash flow 194,647 (36,485) (42,162) (48,694) (56,204)
Cost of capital
Cost of debt 11.8%
Cost of equity




1. Existing cash at the end of 1999 40,755
2. Present value from 2000 to 2004 41,918
3. Terminal value after 2004 (688,357)
4. Net present value (605,685)
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2.6 Scenario #4 of Reorganization Value 
2.6.1 Assumption 
Here, all the assumptions are chosen under the condition tha t Midopa would do its best 
effort to achieve highly effective operating results. 10% cost savings are applied in 
COGS and SG&A.  Sales growth rate is estimated by expert institution. Although 
these assumptions are somewhat optimistic, it is the way for Midopa to go for the 
purpose of its revival.    
 
 
<Data 15 : Assumption of Scenario #4> Forecasting
Adjusted Basic Assumption 
Adjustment
Sales growth Estimated by Kisrating 7.2%
COGS / Sales 10% cost saving from 75.9% of Midopa historical average performance 66.7%
SG&A / Sales 10% cost saving from 19.6% of Industry historical average performance 18.7%
Non-operating income / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 2.9%
Non-operating expenses / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 0.6%
Extraordinary income / Sales Industry Average 0.5%
Extraordinary loss / Sales Industry Average 0.9%
Depreciation Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 2.0%
Amortization Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 23.0%
Account receivable / Sales Industry Average 12.2%
Inventory / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 9.0%
Other current asset / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 1.9%
Investment asset / Sales Industry Average 12.0%
Tangible asset / Sales Industry Average 71.2%
Intangible asset / Sales Industry Average 0.4%
Account Payable / Sales Industry Average 23.0%
Other current liabilities / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 22.2%
Other fixed liabilities / Sales Industry Average 8.2%
Interest rate for payment Industry Average 11.8%
Interest rate for earning Forecasting 8.0%
Dividend payout ratio 0.0%
Tax rate 31.0%
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2.6.2 Income Statement  
Now, Midopa can record a big operating profit through 10% cost saving effect. Also 
ordinary income turned into positive from 2002.
<Data 16 : Income Statement of Scenario #4> Forecasting
Income Statement
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Revenue 298,848 320,365 343,431 368,158 394,666
  - COGS 199,463 213,825 229,220 245,724 263,416
   (Depreciation) 4,247 4,553 4,881 5,232 5,609
Gross profit 95,138 101,988 109,331 117,202 125,641
  - SG&A 55,933 59,960 64,277 68,905 73,866
Operating Profit 39,205 42,027 45,053 48,297 51,775
  + Interest earning 0 0 0 0 0
  + Other non-operating income 8,710 9,337 10,009 10,730 11,503
  - Interst expenses 49,135 50,866 52,479 53,969 55,364
  - Amortization 275 294 316 338 363
   - Other non-operating expenses 1,931 2,070 2,219 2,378 2,550
Ordinary Profit (3,425) (1,865) 49 2,341 5,001
  + Extraordinary income 1,494 1,602 1,717 1,841 1,973
  - Extraordinary loss 2,690 2,883 3,091 3,313 3,552
Net income before tax (4,621) (3,147) (1,324) 868 3,423
  - Corporate tax 0 0 0 269 1,061
Net income aftr tax (4,621) (3,147) (1,324) 599 2,362
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2.6.3 Balance Sheet 
Now, the level of long-term debt is stable. Although total liabilities still exceed total 
asset, the negative equity starts to decrease from 2004. 
<Data 17 : Balance Sheet of Scenario #4> Forecasting
Balance Sheet
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
<Current asset> 69,075 74,048 79,380 85,095 91,222
Cash equivalent 0 0 0 0 0
Account receivable 36,360 38,978 41,784 44,793 48,018
Inventory 26,969 28,911 30,992 33,224 35,616
Others 5,746 6,160 6,603 7,079 7,589
<Fixed asset> 250,036 268,039 287,337 308,026 330,204
Investment asset 35,961 38,551 41,326 44,302 47,491
Tangible asset 212,879 228,207 244,637 262,251 281,133
Intangible asset 1,195 1,281 1,374 1,473 1,579
Total asset 319,111 342,087 366,717 393,121 421,426
<Current liabilities> 135,141 144,871 155,302 166,483 178,470
Short-term debt 0 0 0 0 0
Account payable 68,735 73,684 78,989 84,676 90,773
Others 66,406 71,187 76,312 81,807 87,697
<Fixed liabilities> 439,729 456,122 471,646 486,268 500,225
Long-term debt 415,224 429,852 443,484 456,079 467,862
Others 24,506 26,270 28,161 30,189 32,363
Total liabilities 574,870 600,993 626,947 652,752 678,695
<Equity> (255,759) (258,906) (260,230) (259,631) (257,269)
Paid-in-capital 93,740 93,740 93,740 93,740 93,740
Capital surplus 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963
Retained earning (512,462) (515,609) (516,933) (516,334) (513,972)
Capital adjustment 0 0 0 0 0
Total liabilitiesand equity 319,111 342,087 366,717 393,121 421,426
balance check 0 0 0 0 0
debt to equity ratio -225% -232% -241% -251% -264%
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2.6.4 Valuation 
NPV is quite big compared with previous scenario, even though the assumptions are 
somewhat optimistic. 
  
<Data 18 : Valuation of Scenario #4> Forecasting
Valuation
Free cash flow
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Profit after tax (4,621) (3,147) (1,324) 599 2,362
  + Depreciation 4,247 4,553 4,881 5,232 5,609
  + Amortization 275 294 316 338 363
  + After-tax interest payment 33,903 35,097 36,210 37,239 38,201
  - Increase in current assets (19,526) 4,973 5,331 5,715 6,127
  + Increase in current liabilities (5,985) 9,730 10,431 11,182 11,987
  - Increase in fixed assets at cost (237,319) 18,003 19,299 20,688 22,178
  + Increase in fixed liabilities 10,831 1,764 1,891 2,028 2,174
Free cash flow 295,494 25,316 27,774 30,214 32,390
Cost of capital
Cost of debt 11.8%
Cost of equity




1. Existing cash at the end of 1999 40,755
2. Present value from 2000 to 2004 360,724
3. Terminal value after 2004 396,688
4. Net present value 798,167
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3. Financial Restructuring 
 
After finishing valuation of a firm, it is time to find out optimal treatment on the firm. If 
liquidation value is higher than reorganization value, it is better for the firm to be 
liquidated. However, if reorganization value is greater than liquidation value, it is 
expected for the firm to be continued its business. Then financial restructuring is 
required in order to accelerate the firm’s normalization. 
  
3.1 Comparison between Liquidation Value and Reorganization Value 
3.1.1 Liquidation Value 
Liquidation value is estimated to be 354,216 million won and creditors’ loss is –475,625 
million won in terms of market value. Creditors loss –475,625 million won is estimated 
by subtracting total liabilities from liquidation value.  
<Table 16 : Liquidation Value and Creditors’ Loss>   
(Unit : million won) 
 Value Creditors’ loss 
Book value 575,956 - 253,885 
Assessed market value 354,216 - 475,625 
* Creditors’ loss = firm value – total outstanding liabilities 
* Total outstanding liabilities : 829,841 billion won (as at the end of 1999) 
3.1.2 Reorganization Value 
Reorganization value has the range from –881,401 to 798,167 according to scenarios. 
So does creditors’ loss from –1,711,241 to –31,674 million won.   
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<Table 17 : Reorganization Value and Creditors’ Loss>   
 (Unit : million won) 
 Value Creditors’ loss 
Scenario #1 - 881,401 - 1,711,241 
Scenario #2 14,306 - 815,535 
Scenario #3 - 605,685 - 1,435,526 
Scenario #4 798,167 - 31,674 
3.1.3 Comparison of Value 
Without financial restructuring, all reorganization values as well as liquidation value are 
not enough to repay the total outstanding liabilities. 
The magnitude of creditors’ loss is huge in every scenario of reorganization value as 
well as liquidation value. The best scenario shown in Scenario #4 assumes the most 
optimistic assumption including 10% cost saving effect.  
So, from the creditors’ point of view, it is very difficult to judge whether Midopa should 
be liquidated or continue its operation through reorganization. 
Even though the liquidation value is larger than reorganization value in the scenario #1, 
#2, #3, it does not give a confident signal for creditors to choose a liquidation of the 
firm, because the size of loss affecting to creditors is too huge in both cases. 
In the case of scenario #4, creditors can reduce their losses significantly, even though 
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< Chart 2 : Comparison of Value > 








3.2 Need for Financial Restructuring 
If the creditors decide to have their loan repaid from distressed firm through continuous 
operation rather than liquidation, financial supports to the firm are needed to alleviate 
firm’s financial burden and to create profits through stable operation. 
To provide some favorable condition to financially distressed firm or to change existing 
debt condition into less burdensome also give creditors certain merits such as securing 
and accelerating of debt repayment. 
Recently, there are a few methods that creditors can generally provide to firm in Korea.   
3.2.1. Recapitalization through Debt for Equity Swap 
Some portion of debt is converted into equity to alleviate debtors’ interest payment 
burden. Creditors can take capital gain when the firm is normalized. 
Usually, creditors require the capital reduction to existing shareholders, especially 
majority shareholders before conducting the debt for equity swap. 




Scenario #1 Scenario #2 Scenario #4 Scenario #3 
Reorganization Value 
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3.2.2 Debt Rescheduling or Debt Forgiveness 
Through this method, creditors can stabilize a financially distressed firm. Then the firm 
can be free from cash flow shortage in the short run. Usually, short-term debt is 
converted into long-term debt and some years of grace period is applied.  
3.2.3 Interest Exemption or Interest Rate Reduction 
Through this method, creditors can also stabilize a financially distressed firm. Usually 
this is used together with debt rescheduling mentioned in 3.2.2. 
 
3.3 Imaginary Restructuring of Midopa 
It is difficult for creditors to choose the one alternative between liquidation and 
reorganization of Midopa. However, it is clear that the scenario #4 can be the choice of 
creditors when creditors simply compare the valuation results.  
Although the creditors’ losses can be minimized through scenario #4, financial 
restructuring is required in order to accelerate the normalization of Midopa. 
Therefore, we are making another financial model, scenario #5, reflecting the financial 
restructuring. In scenario #5, debt for equity swap and reduction of interest rate are 
adopted to reduce interest payment burden. 100% of capital reduction is assumed, 
which can satisfy creditors who are to convert their debt into equity.  
The amount of debt for equity swap is 50% of total outstanding long-term debt as at the 
end of 1999. Then 1% of interest rate is reduced in order for firm value to exceed the 
debt value.  
Therefore, creditors can be repaid all their outstanding debt afterwards through debt 
repayment (50%) and selling their stock (50%) obtained from debt for equity swap. 
Debt rescheduling, debt forgiveness and interest exemption is not applied here. 
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3.4 Scenario #5 of Reorganization Value 
3.4.1 Assumption 
Most of value drivers are same with those of scenario #4. According to financial 
restructuring, long-term debt is decreased in half and interest rate is reduced from 11.8% 





<Data 19 : Assumption of Scenario #5> Forecasting
Adjusted Basic Assumption with Financial Restructuring
Adjustment
Sales growth Estimated by Kisrating 7.2%
COGS / Sales 10% cost saving from 75.9% of Midopa historical average performance 66.7%
SG&A / Sales 10% cost saving from 19.6% of Industry historical average performance 18.7%
Non-operating income / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 2.9%
Non-operating expenses / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 0.6%
Extraordinary income / Sales Industry Average 0.5%
Extraordinary loss / Sales Industry Average 0.9%
Depreciation Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 2.0%
Amortization Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 23.0%
Account receivable / Sales Industry Average 12.2%
Inventory / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 9.0%
Other current asset / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 1.9%
Investment asset / Sales Industry Average 12.0%
Tangible asset / Sales Industry Average 71.2%
Intangible asset / Sales Industry Average 0.4%
Account Payable / Sales Industry Average 23.0%
Other current liabilities / Sales Adjusted historical performance of Midopa 22.2%
Other fixed liabilities / Sales Industry Average 8.2%
Interest rate for payment Industry Average 10.8%
Interest rate for earning Forecasting 8.0%
Dividend payout ratio 0.0%
Tax rate 31.0%
Capital Reduction 100%
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3.4.2 Income Statement 
Interest expenses are significantly reduced after debt for equity swap. Accordingly, net 
income is getting bigger continuously.   
 
 
<Data 20 : Income Statement of Scenario #5> Forecasting
Income Statement
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Revenue 298,848 320,365 343,431 368,158 394,666
  - COGS 199,463 213,825 229,220 245,724 263,416
   (Depreciation) 4,247 4,553 4,881 5,232 5,609
Gross profit 95,138 101,988 109,331 117,202 125,641
  - SG&A 55,933 59,960 64,277 68,905 73,866
Operating Profit 39,205 42,027 45,053 48,297 51,775
  + Interest earning 0 0 0 0 0
  + Other non-operating income 8,710 9,337 10,009 10,730 11,503
  - Interst expenses 15,936 14,713 13,210 11,392 9,219
  - Amortization 275 294 316 338 363
   - Other non-operating expenses 1,931 2,070 2,219 2,378 2,550
Ordinary Profit 29,773 34,288 39,319 44,919 51,146
  + Extraordinary income 1,494 1,602 1,717 1,841 1,973
  - Extraordinary loss 2,690 2,883 3,091 3,313 3,552
Net income before tax 28,578 33,006 37,945 43,446 49,567
  - Corporate tax 8,859 10,232 11,763 13,468 15,366
Net income aftr tax 19,719 22,774 26,182 29,978 34,201
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1.4.3 Balance Sheet 
Now, the amount of total assets exceeds total liabilities. Debt to equity ratio starts to 
drop from 2000.  
 
 
<Data 21 : Balance Sheet of Scenario #5> Forecasting
Balance Sheet
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
<Current asset> 69,075 74,048 79,380 85,095 91,222
Cash equivalent 0 0 0 0 0
Account receivable 36,360 38,978 41,784 44,793 48,018
Inventory 26,969 28,911 30,992 33,224 35,616
Others 5,746 6,160 6,603 7,079 7,589
<Fixed asset> 250,036 268,039 287,337 308,026 330,204
Investment asset 35,961 38,551 41,326 44,302 47,491
Tangible asset 212,879 228,207 244,637 262,251 281,133
Intangible asset 1,195 1,281 1,374 1,473 1,579
Total asset 319,111 342,087 366,717 393,121 421,426
<Current liabilities> 135,141 144,871 155,302 166,483 178,470
Short-term debt 0 0 0 0 0
Account payable 68,735 73,684 78,989 84,676 90,773
Others 66,406 71,187 76,312 81,807 87,697
<Fixed liabilities> 171,610 162,081 150,099 135,343 117,459
Long-term debt 147,104 135,811 121,938 105,154 85,097
Others 24,506 26,270 28,161 30,189 32,363
Total liabilities 306,750 306,952 305,401 301,826 295,930
<Equity> 12,361 35,135 61,317 91,295 125,496
Paid-in-capital 337,520 337,520 337,520 337,520 337,520
Capital surplus 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963 162,963
Retained earning (488,122) (465,348) (439,166) (409,188) (374,987)
Capital adjustment 0 0 0 0 0
Total liabilitiesand equity 319,111 342,087 366,717 393,121 421,426
balance check 0 0 0 0 0
debt to equity ratio 2482% 874% 498% 331% 236%
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3.4.4 Valuation 
Here, NPV as a firm value is bigger than outstanding debt as at the end of 1999.  
 
<Data 22 : Valuation of Scenario #5> Forecasting
Valuation
Free cash flow
(unit : million won)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Profit after tax 19,719 22,774 26,182 29,978 34,201
  + Depreciation 4,247 4,553 4,881 5,232 5,609
  + Amortization 275 294 316 338 363
  + After-tax interest payment 10,996 10,152 9,115 7,860 6,361
  - Increase in current assets (19,526) 4,973 5,331 5,715 6,127
  + Increase in current liabilities (5,985) 9,730 10,431 11,182 11,987
  - Increase in fixed assets at cost (237,319) 18,003 19,299 20,688 22,178
  + Increase in fixed liabilities 10,831 1,764 1,891 2,028 2,174
Free cash flow 296,927 26,292 28,185 30,214 32,390
Cost of capital
Cost of debt 10.8%
Cost of equity




1. Existing cash at the end of 1999 40,755
2. Present value from 2000 to 2004 366,973
3. Terminal value after 2004 433,306
4. Net present value 841,034
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V. Conclusion 
 
1. Implication of the Study 
 
Through the case study of Midopa Department Store, four implications regarding 
financial distress are observed. 
First, financial distress results from a combination of several causes such as unwise 
expansion, intense competition, poor management, and excessive debt.  
In the case of Midopa, financial distress was caused by a combination of 1) unwise 
expansion through M&A, 2) decrease in market share by intense competition resulting 
from chaebol’s new entrance and introduction of discount stores, 3) poor management 
against hostile M&A, and 4) high debt-to-equity ratio of over 500%. 
Second, financial distress can be somewhat forecasted in advance. 
In Midopa’s case, critical ratios like sales growth rate, turnover ratio of account 
receivables and the level of financing cost were worse than those of the industry 
average. In the multiple discriminant analysis through the Z-score model, Midopa 
recorded a low Z-score, which implied the firm’s failure within a year. For sure, it is 
recognized that the application of the Z-score model might be inadequate, because the 
model was made based on US firms’ historical performance. 
Third, the valuation is not an easy process and the results do not give a confident signal 
in decision-making of either liquidation or restructuring. In this case, the range of value 
is so wide according to assumptions of each scenario. 
Finally, financial restructuring of a firm can accelerate firm’s normalization and 
creditors can be repaid their money through capital gain from enhanced firm’s equity 
value when they conducted debt for equity swap as shown in Midopa case.  
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2. Comparison between Pro-forma Restructuring and Real Situation 
 
This thesis found that Midopa was explicitly “Flow-Based” and implicitly “Stock-
Based” insolvent, and recommends restructuring instead of liquidation.  
As a real situation,  Midopa is now implementing a reorganization process under court 
receivership. Maybe real creditors also might anticipate that the reorganization value is 
higher than the liquidation value in line with the pro-forma valuation of conducted in 
chapter IV.  
Currently, Midopa is accelerating a reorganization plan and pursuing normalization of 
operations within 3 years. Its target looks viable considering the currently enhanced 
performance such as 29% sales growth in the first half of 2000, which is much better 
than the forecasting of 7.2% in scenario #4 and #5.  
Profitability was also improved. Midopa recorded a 10% operating profit margin in the 
first half, even though that record does not reach the estimates from scenario #4 and #5 
assuming a 10% cost saving. 
In summary, the recommendation for Midopa was continuous operation through 
reorganization instead of liquidation, which is similar to the current real situation of 
Midopa. 
It is hoped that Midopa will achieve normalization within 3years as they announced.  
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